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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
INTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELIANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 14635 
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff, Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, to enforce an indemnity provision 
in its lease agreement with the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was heard by the court based upon stipu-
lated facts, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, 
presiding. The court found the legal issues in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant. Judgment was entered 
accordingly.· From said conclusions of law and judgment, this 
appeal is taken. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case were undisputed and submitted 
to the court by stipulation of the parties (R 88). The stip-
ulation recites as follows: 
1. Union Pacific Railroad Company is now, and has 
been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, operating 
a railroad system in the State of Utah and in surrounding 
states. 
2. Intermountain Farmers Association is now, and 
has been at all times material hereto, a corporation organized 
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. On February 6, 1964, plaintiff and its lessor, 
Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company, entered into a 
written agreement with defendant (Hereinafter referred to as 
"Subject Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit "A", and by this reference made a part hereof, 
that provides in general for the leasing of certain property 
(Hereinafter referred to as the "Leased Premises"), at Draper, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, for a warehouse, grainery, cold stor-
age, platform, and driveway site. 
2 
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4. Pursuant to an extension rider dated October 9, 
1968, a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "B", 
and by this reference made a part hereof, and an addendum, 
dated December 31, 1970, a copy of which is attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit "C", and by this reference made a part hereof, 
the terms and conditions of the Subject Agreement were in 
full force and effect to and including November 30, 1973. 
S. At approximately 7:00 o'clock p.m., on October 
31, 1972, at a time when the Subject Agreement was in full 
force and effect, and while plaintiff's employees were per-
forming a switching operation on the railroad track imnediately 
adjacent to the Leased Premise~, one Richard V. Richins, 
conductor in charge and an employee of plaintiff, sustained 
severe and permanent injuries. Richins claims that he sus-
tained such injuries when knocked from the second locomotive 
unit of a two-unit diesel engine upon which he was riding by 
a spool of cable owned by Intermountain Farmers, said spool 
of cable being located on the Leased Premises in a position 
closer than eight (8) feet six (6) inches to the center line 
of the nearest track of the plaintiff. 
6. At the time Richins sustained said injuries, 
plaintiff was engaged as a common carrier in interstate 
commerce; Richins was employed by plaintiff in such commerce; 
3 
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and Richins' said injuries occurred in the scope and course 
of his employment for plaintiff. 
7. At the time Richins sustained his injuries, it 
was dark and it had just recently stopped snowing. There was 
some snow on the ground, as evidenced by the photographs 
secured on the morning following the accident and attached 
hereto as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G", "H" and "I", and by 
this reference made a part hereof. In addition, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "J", and by this reference made a part here-
of, is a copy of a Local Climatological Data Report showing 
weather conditions and precipitation levels recorded at the 
Salt Lake International Airport during the month of October 
1972. The scene of the accident is approximately 18 to 20 
miles from said weather reporting station in a southeasterly 
direction. 
8. The train in question, consisting of two loco-
motive units, twelve loaded cars, twenty empty cars, and a 
caboose, departed Salt Lake City, Utah, at approximately 6:00 
o'clock p.m., on October 31, 1972, enroute to Provo, Utah. 
9. The train arrived at Intermountain Farmers 
Association's facility at Draper, Utah, shortly before 7:00 
o'clock p.m., and was stopped on the main line track adjacent 
to defendant's facility headed generally in an eastbound 
I. 
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I 
L 
compass direction. 
10. Immediately to the north of the Leased Prem-
ises were three sets of railroad tracks as shown in the print 
marked Exhibit "K", and by this reference made a part hereof. 
The trackage immediately north of defendant's facility is 
identified as the "Poultry Track," the center track is iden-
tified as the "Main Line Track," and the track to the north 
of the Leased Premises is identified as the "Passing Track." 
The area north of defendant's facility and north of where the 
tracks are located is fenced by the land owner on the north, 
said fence running east and west. See three photographs 
taken September 26, 1975, and marked Exhibit "Q", attached 
hereto, and by this reference made a part hereof. The area 
north of the fence referred to as depicted in these photo-
graphs is not owned by or leased by Intermountain Farmers. 
11. The two locomotive units (3645-A and 137-B) 
were detached from the balance of the train remaining on the 
main line trackage, pulled forward beyond the switch into 
the poultry track, and subsequently backed in a westerly 
direction along the poultry track adjacent to the Intermountain 
Farmers Association's facility. 
12. At the time of this backward movement along 
the poultry track, the engineer, an employee of plaintiff, was 
5 
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operating the two locomotive units from the east locomotive 
(3645-A) seated at the controls located on the south side of 
the east locomotive cab. 
13. The brakeman, Levi Ki Tua'one, an employee 
of plaintiff, was riding the west locomotive (137-B), on the 
southwest corner thereof. He was a student brakeman and this 
was his third road trip out of the yard. 
14. The lead or west locomotive unit identified as 
137-B which entered the poultry track first had two headlights 
operating at the time to illuminate the track and right of way, 
These headlights, located one above the other on the horizon-
tal center line of the locomotive, approximately 12 feet 5 
inches above the rail, were seven inches in diameter and pro-
diced a total beam candle power of 600,000 units. The brakeman 
claims there was plenty of light to see the tracks as they 
were backing. He said he had no trouble seeing where he was 
going (Deposition of Tua 1one, pages 9 and 34). 
15. The purpose of the westerly inbound movement 
was to pick up two empty but separated box cars located on 
the poultry track serving the defendant. These two box cars 
(UP 165227 and LN 12470) at the time of the inbound move were 
1 d Exh]..bi" t "D'1• ocate over the bare spots in the snow depicted in 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16. During the westerly inbound move on the poultry 
track, the southwest steps of Unit 137-B upon which the brake-
man was riding at the time must have passed by or over the 
spool of cable; however, the brakeman claims he did not observe 
the spool of cable. He says he was maintaining a lookout and 
did not see any obstruction or obstacle to the movement of the 
train. 
17. Plaintiff's employees claim they were perform-
ing their duties for the railroad company in the customary 
and routine manner under the circumstances. The railroad 
company procedure is such that before backing a train, the 
track must be free from obstruction to train movement and the 
track must either be seen during the movement or known to be 
clear (Richins' Deposition, page 53). 
18. During the westbound movement on the poultry 
track, Conductor Richins, who had been riding the caboose from 
Salt Lake City to Draper, had dismounted from the caboose and 
had walked easterly between the main line track and the poultry 
track to assist in the switching operation being conducted on 
the poultry track (Second Deposition of Richins, pages 22 and 
23). 
19. Mr. Richins stated in his deposition, 
7 
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"Q. Did you know when you left the yard to 
go south that he was a new man 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. - - a new brakeman? 
"A. Yes. That is why I was going to help. 
"Q. Had he been an experienced brakeman, 
would you have left the caboose that 
night? 
"A. I'd have left the caboose but chances 
are I wouldn't have concentracted S'.l 
much on the work that was at hand. I 
would have -- there are other duties that 
I have that I could have been doing. 
"Q. You would have allowed him -- if he had 
been an experienced brakeman you would 
have allowed him to do the connecting 
himself? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. You wouldn't have assisted him in doing 
that necessarily unless he asked? 
"A. Unless I happened to be there. If I had 
arrived there at a time when I could 
assist I'd assist, but in inspecting the 
train, when I walk up, instead of concen-
trating so much on getting up there help-
ing him, I would have spent more time 
looking the train over." (Second Deposi-
tion of Richins, pages 22 and 23.) 
20. After the two locomotives reached the first 
car on the poultry track, identified as UP 165227, the brake-
man made the connection between the two locomotives and said 
car. 
8 
--
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21. Conductor Richins, who by this time had arrived 
at the west car on the poultry track (LN 12470), transmitted 
instructions to the engineer by walkie-talkie radio which he 
was carrying to facilitate the coupling between UP 165227 and 
LN 12470. The track where the switching was being conducted 
was curved in such a manner that the engineer could not see to 
the rear of the train and visually receive signals from the 
brakeman or conductor, so the conductor was transmitting sig-
nals by radio in the customary and authorized manner under 
such circumstances. 
22. After the coupling had been completed and the 
brake air lines charged, Conductor Richins advised the engi-
neer by walkie-talkie radio to commence the eastbound movement 
in order to return to the main line trackage and the balance 
of the train. 
23. As the movement commenced, Conductor Richins 
and the brakeman simultaneously stepped aboard the southwest 
corner of trailing locomotive 137-B. Richins testified that 
he would not have mounted the train as it moved out to the 
main line but would have walked over to the caboose if it hadn't 
been for the rubbish, slimy dust, brain dust or grain on the 
ground in the area (See Richins' deposition, page 28, lines 1-5; 
9 
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page 34, lines 6-11; page 35, lines 5-13, 22-25; and page 
36, lines 1-2). 
24. The brakeman claims he had both of his feet 
located on the bottom step of trailing locomotive 137-B, as 
depicted in the photograph marked Exhibit "L", and Conductor 
Richins claims he had his right foot on the bottom step and 
left foot on the foot board, as depicted in said Exhibit "L". 
Richins said both men were crowding onto the same area but 
that such a situation was not abnormal or unusual with a 
student brakeman (Second Deposition of Richins, page 18). 
25. After the movement had obtained the speed of 
approximately three to five miles per hour and had moved 
approximately two box car lengths, Conductor Richins claims 
he was knocked off the moving train by the spool of cable 
CMiled by the defendant and depicted in Exhibits "E", "F", "G", 
"H", and "I", precipitating the injuries sustained. 
26. At the time of the accident, Conductor Richins 
was riding the train movement on the south side of the poultry 
track next to the Intermountain Farmers Association's facility, 
under lease to the defendant. The spool of one-half inch 
steel cable, as depicted in the photographs marked Exhibits "E", 
"F", "G", "H", and "I", at the time of the accident was located 
1n 
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within eight (8) feet six (6) inches from the center line of 
the poultry track illlDEldiately adjacent to the Leaaed Premiaee. 
27. Neither plaintiff nor any of ita employees, 
agents, servants, etc. claims to have been aware of or to have 
observed the subject spool of cable at any time prior to the 
accident. 
28. After the accident, the spool of cable owned 
by defendant was observed to be located approximately one 
foot south of the south rail of the poultry track in the loca• 
tion shown in the photographs marked Exhibits "E", "F", "G", 
"H", and "I". The distance between the rails of the poultry 
track was four (4) feet eight and one-half (8\) inches. 
29. Defendant claims to have last seen the spool 
of cable located right next to its building immediately south 
of the poultry track where the accident occurred. At about 
11:00 o'clock a.~. on the day prior to the accident, an em-
ployee of defendant, Robert w. Turley, its plant manager, made 
an inspection of the building, by wnlking along the same. 
Such inspections were made approximately once a week (Turley 
deposition, pages 14, 15 and 37). 
30. Defendant's employees disclaim having any 
knowledge as to how the spool of cable got to its location at 
11 
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or near the track on the night of the accident. The night of 
the accident in question was Halloween night. 
31. The dimensions of the spool were approximately 
one (1) foot in height by two (2) feet four (4) inches in 
length. Attached to the spool was some one-half inch (1/2) 
steel cable. The defendant claims it never used the spool 
and cable. 
32. By letter, dated December 15, 1972, plaintiff 
advised defendant in writing of the subject accident, ex-
pressed the opinion that legal action was apparent, and 
provided defendant full opportunity to defend or participate 
in the disposition thereof. (A copy of said letter, marked 
Exhibit "M", is attached hereto.) 
33. On or about January 29, 1973, said Richard V. 
Richins filed an action, alleging negligent conduct against 
the Railroad, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, entitled "Richard V. Richins vs. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company," identified as Civil Number 
210084, demanding judgment for injuries sustained in the 
above-described accident in the sum of $750,000.00; such 
action was brought under and by virtue of the provisions of 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51, 
et seq. 
12 
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34. On February 21, 1973, the Railroad notified 
Intermountain Farmers in writing of the pendency of such 
action and again provided Intermountain Farmers full oppor-
tunity to defend the Railroad or participate in the defense 
against Richins' law suit. A copy of said notification is 
attached hereto, marked Exhibit "N", and by this reference 
made a part hereof. By letter, dated March 22, 1973, 
Intermountain Farmers declined to accept tender of the case. 
35. By a hand-delivered letter, dated and 
delivered October 24, 1973, the Railroad advised Intermo\llltain 
Farmers that, following extensive settlement negotiations 
with Richard v. Richins' legal counsel, the Railroad had 
agreed to compromise Mr. Richins' case for $162,500.00. In 
said letter, the Railroad requested that Intermountain 
Farmers be prepared to tender the compromise payment of 
$162,500.00 to Mr. Richins at the settlement conference 
scheduled for October 31, 1973. A copy of said letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "O", and by this reference made 
a part hereof. 
36. On October 31, 1973, the Railroad, by way of 
compromise and in order to settle Mr. Richins' action and 
secure a release, paid to said Richard V. Richins the sum of 
13 
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$162,500.00. Intermountain Farmers' name was included in the 
Release, but not by its request. A copy of said Release is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "P", and by this reference made a 
part hereof. 
37. At all times mentioned herein, Intermountain 
Farmers rejected the tender of defense of the claim and suit 
brought by Mr. Richins and rejected any and all offers of 
the Railroad to enter into negotiations and/or settlement of 
Richins' suit. 
38. On or about November 15, 1973, the Railroad 
ins:i.tuted this action to recover from the Intermountain 
Farmers said $162,500.00, together with defense costs and 
expenses in the sum of $1,195.00, reasonable attorneys' fees 
in the sum of $1,840.00, and deposition expenses of $97.50, 
for a total sum of $165,632.50. 
39. Under the provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act herein referred to, a jury issue was presented 
as to whether or not the Railroad was negligent and would 
have been held legally liable to Richard V. Richins for the 
injuries he sustained as described above, and the Railroad 
could have been held legally liable by a jury or court for 
such injuries sustained. 
14 
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40. It is agreed by the parties that the settle-
ment made by the Railroad with Conductor Richins in his law 
suit under the provisions of said Federal Employers' Liability 
Act is deemed reasonable in all respects, including all costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
41. The respective parties further stipulate that 
all depositions taken in this action may be published and 
used by the Court for the purpose of making its decision 
herein. 
From the facts set forth above, the plaintiff con-
tended that it was entitled to indemnification by the terms 
of its lease agreement with the defendant. The lease provi-
sions applicable are as follows: 
"Section 5. It is especially covenanted 
and agreed that the use of the leased 
premises or any part thereof for any un-
lawful or imnoral purposes whatsoever is 
expressly prohibited; that the Lessee shall 
hold harmless the Lessor and the leased 
premises from any and all liens, fines, 
damages, penalties, forfeitures, or judg-
ments in any manner accruing by reason of 
the use or occupation of said premises by 
the Lessee; and that the Lessee shall at 
all times protect the Lessor and the 
leased premises from all injury, damage, 
or loss by reason of the occupation of 
the leased premises by the Lessee, or from 
any cause whatsoever growing out of said 
Lessee's use thereof." (Emphasis ours.) 
l'i 
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"Section 11. The Lessee shall be liable 
for any and all injuries to or damage to 
persons or property, of whatsoever nature 
or kind, arising out of or contributed to 
by any breach in whole or in part of any 
covenant of this agreement." (R 99, 100) 
From said stipulated facts and based upon the lease 
provisions, the court entered its Conclusions of Law. In 
doing so, the court concluded as a matter of law that the 
lease agreement between the parties required the defendant to 
indemnify the plaintiff Railroad for any injuries sustained 
by Richard V. Richins, the employee of the Railroad, as a 
result of his accident on October 31, 1972, while performing 
duties for the Railroad on the leased premises. The court 
further found as a matter of law as follows: 
"The Court further concludes that the negli-
gence of either party is not an issue or a 
necessary element to the conclusion of this 
action." (R 155) 
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
regardless of the negligence of the Railroad, Intermountain 
Farmers, or both, the lease agreement provided absolute in-
demnification and in effect, required that defendant be an 
insurer of the safety of the employees of the Railroad while 
switching operations took place on defendant's leased prem-
ises. 
16 
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l 
POINT URGED FOR REVERSAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PIAINTIFF WAS 
ENTITLED TO UNRESTRICTED INDEMNIFICATION FROM DEFENDANT 
BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMS OF THE LEASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT PIAINTIFF WAS 
ENTITLED TO UNRESTRICTED INDEMNIFICATION FROM DEFENDANT 
BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMS OF THE LEASE. 
Plaintiff's employee, Richins, the conductor of 
the train in question, was injured on the leased premises 
of Intermountain Farmers Association while an engine was 
being used to remove two empty box cars from the premises. 
The plaintiff's brakeman, working with Richins, signaled to 
the engineer of the train to back into the premises of the 
defendant when the area adjacent to the track was apparently 
obstructed with a partially wound spool of cable (Exhibit 
"A"). By stipulation of facts, the parties admitted that 
although the train carried dual headlights emitting 600,000 
candle power lighting the tracks, the trainee brakeman never-
theless claimed that he failed to see the spool near the 
track. He admitted there was plenty of light to see the 
tracks as they were slowly backing and he had no trouble seeing 
where he was going. (R 91) It was also admitted by the 
Railroad's employees and the plaintiff herein that railroad 
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regulations forbid the backing of a train unless the track 
is free of obstruction to the movement of the train and the 
regulations further require that the railroad employees 
must either be able to see the track during the train's 
movement or know for a fact that the track and surrounding 
area are clear. (R 92) In any event, the engine and one 
car passed by the spool and came to a stop with the spool 
very near the edge of the tracks as is evidenced by Exhibit 
"B". At this point, the conductor, Richins, connected the 
second car and then got onto the platform of the engine with 
the trainee brakeman. Both employees attempted to occupy 
the same step or platform of the locomotive as the engine 
started its forward movement out of the siding. As the 
train commenced moving out of the yard, a portion of the 
engine apparently again passed near the spool where the leg 
of the conductor, Richins, evidently, in some manner, came 
:in contact with the spool, causing him to fall to the ground 
resulting in severe injuries to his right leg. 
As is indicated in the recitation of facts, an 
employee. of Intermountain Farmers claimed to have walked 
along the tracks where the accident occurred on the day prior 
to the accident and that such was done in making inspection 
18 
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of the building. While making the inspection tour, the 
employee stated he saw no spool of cable in the track area 
nor had heerer seen a spool of cable prior to that time. 
It should further be noted that on the night in question, 
it was Halloween and the area involved, including the plain-
tiff's train tracks, are unfenced. 
The plaintiff claims that regardless of any negli-
gence of its own employees or any negligence of the 
defendant's employees, or a combination of both, the lease 
agreement requires absolute indemnification. Based upon this 
assumption, the Railroad, after having been sued by Conductor 
Richins for its alleged negligence, made payment to Richins 
in settlement. It thereafter sought indemnification from the 
defendant herein under the terms of its lease. 
It is respectfully pointed out that nowhere in the 
lease agreement does it require or exact from the defendant 
a duty of indemnification for the negligence of the Railroad. 
(R 99, 100) It is admitted that the Railroad settled its 
obligation to Mr. Richins based upon his allegations of negli-
gent conduct of the Railroad only. The defendant herein was 
not a party to that litigation, nor did Richins ever sue this 
defendant. 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After reviewing the stipulated facts and the ex-
hibits herein, including the depositions of the parties, the 
trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that it made no 
difference whether or not plaintiff or defendant were negli-
gent, or either in combination, the lease agreement required 
absolute indemnification as a matter of law. 
This Court has repeatedly held that indemnification 
does not apply unless it is specifically spelled out in no un-
certain terms. This Court has further held that the intention 
of the parties to indemnify must be ascertained from the con-
tract as a whole; doubt or \.lllcertainty should be strictly 
construed against the parties who prepared the agreement. 
Union Pacific Railroad vs. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 
2d 255, 508 P.2d 910. The contract of lease in the instant 
case was drawn by the Railroad. It was in effect for many 
years and was, from time to time, renewed by agreement. (R 103) 
In spite of each renewal, no change was ever made in the 
alleged indemnity provisions. This Court has repeatedly held 
that where one party wishes to be indemnified for its own 
negligence or its negligence in conjunction with the negligence 
of others, it must specifically so state in the agreement. 
The Court will not imply indemnity and will construe the 
20 
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indemnity provisions strictly against the party drawing the 
agreement. Had the Railroad wished to conform to the more 
recent decisions from this Honorable Court, it could have 
revised its indemnification provisions at the renewal of 
the lease by simple amendment if such were the intentions 
of the parties. This, however, was not done. Appellant 
concedes that a properly worded contract of indemnity between 
the Railroad and third persons, such as the appellant herein, 
could impose liability for negligent conduct even of the 
Railroad; however, such a contract cannot be ambiguous and 
must state with particularity the clear intent of the parties 
to be so bound. Unless the agreement is clearly stated to 
show the intent of the parties, it would not be so construed. 
It is well settled that a contract purporting to 
indemnify one for his own negligence will be strictly con-
strued in favor of the indemnitor. See 41 AmJur 2d, Indemnity, 
Section 15, Pages 699 and 700, wherein the author states: 
"A contract of indemnity purporting or 
claimed to relieve one from the conse-
quences of his failure to exercise 
ordinary care must be strictly construed. 
Accordingly, it is frequently stated as 
the general rule that a contract of in-
demnity will not be construed to indemnify 
the indemnitee against losses resulting 
from his own negligent acts, unless no 
other meaning can be ascribed to it. 
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"Mere, general, broad, and seemingly all-
inclusive language in the indemnifying 
agreement has been said not to be suffi-
cient to impose liability for the 
indemnitee's own negligence •••• " 
The facts of the instant case clearly show that the 
trainee brakeman who had a duty to make sure the tracks were 
clear for travel apparently failed to watch where he was going 
as the train slowly moved into the yard or he saw but failed 
to heed the spool near the tracks. His negligent conduct 
obviously would have been imputed to the railroad, making 
it liable to its conductor, Richins, who was injured as a 
result of the employee's improper lookout. 
In reviewing the facts, one must further conclude 
that the negligence of the brakeman, in not watching where 
the train was moving or failing to heed what was there to be 
seen, was active negligence. This Court has, on numerous 
occasions, adhered to the rule that a person is chargeable 
with seeing what, in the exercise of reasonable care, he 
should have seen. The spool allegedly causing the injury 
was certainly there to be seen when the track backed into 
the siding. 
The Utah decisions are entirely harmonious with 
the rule heretofore referred to in the American Jurisprudence 
citation. 
22 
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In Jankele vs. Texas Company, 54 P.2d 425, the 
Utah Supreme Court expressed doubt that a contract to in-
demnify one for his own negligence would be enforcible since 
it probably would be against public policy. This Honorable 
Court stated: 
"The contract does not pretend to re-
lieve the defendant from damages 
occasioned by reason of improper and 
negligent installation. No such con-
struction can be given to the contract. 
It is very doubtful that defendant 
could relieve itself by contract from 
its own negligence. Ordinarily such 
contracts are contrary to public 
policy." 
The same thought was expressed in Walker Bank & 
Trust Company vs. First Security Corporation, 341 P.2d 944; 
there the Court stated: 
"Assuming that in the absence of some 
consideration of public policy mili-
tating against it, one may contract 
to protect himself against liability 
for loss caused by his negligence, 
it is nevertheless well settled that 
contracts in which a party attempts to 
do so are subject to strict construc-
tion against himself; and further, that 
he will be afforded no protection unless 
preclusion against negligence is clearly 
and unequivocally stated.• 
A case analogous to the one at bar is Barrus vs. 
Wilkinson vs. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 16 Utah 
2d 204, 398 P.2d 207. In that case, a tenant's employee 
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slipped and fell in a common hallway and sued the landlord 
who in turn filed a third party complaint against the 
tenant for indemnity by virtue of the terms in a lease 
agreement. The indemnity agreement provided that: 
" ••• the Lessee will save and hold the 
Lessor harmless from all loss, damage, 
liability, or expense resulting from 
any injury to any person •••• caused by 
or resulting from any act of the Lessee 
or any officer, agent or employee of 
the Lessee, or about the leased prem-
ises or said building." 
This Honorable Court affirmed on appeal the dis-
missal granted by the trial court and said: 
11 
••• where an indemnity agreement is in-
volved, it is generally held that the 
agreement will not be construed to 
cover losses to the indemnitee caused 
by his own negligent acts unless such 
intention is expressed clearly and un-
equivocally. Especially is this true 
where an affirmative act of negligence 
is involved." 
This Honorable Court then went on to state: 
"The intention to indemnify the defend-
ants from their negligent acts is not 
clearly and unequivocally expressed in 
the lease agreement •••• The district 
court correctly dismissed the third 
party complaint." 
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. 
El Paso Natural Gas Company, supra, this Court said: 
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"In support of its claim for indemnifica-
tion from the defendant, Union Pacific 
urges that it was its desire, and that the 
defendant agreed: that as a condition to 
granting the right of way it was to be pro-
tected just as though the pipeline did not 
exist. The specific language upon which 
·this contention is based is that the defend-
ant would indemnify and hold the Union 
Pacific harmless: 
' ••• from and against any and all lia-
bility damage, claims, •••• of what-
soever nature, •••• growing out of 
injury or harm to or death of persons 
whomsoever, or loss or destruction of 
or damage to property whatsoever, in-
cluding the pipe line, when such 
injury, harm, death, loss, destruc-
tion or damage, howsoever caused, 
grows out of or arises from the 
bursting of or leaks in the pipe line, 
or in any other way whatsoever is due 
to or arises because of the existence 
of the pipe line or the construction, 
operation, maintenance, repair, 
renewal, reconstruction or use of the 
pipe line or any part thereof, or to 
the contents therein or therefrom.' 
(Emphasis added.)" 
In holding the lease language insufficient to establish a con-
tract of indemnity, this Honorable Court said: 
"A closely related proposition pertinent here-
to is that the law does not look with favor 
upon one exacting a covenant to relieve him-
self of the basic duty which the law imposes 
on everyone; that of using due care for the 
safety of himself and others. This would 
tend to encourage carelessness and would not 
be salutary either for the person seeking to 
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protect himself or for those whose safety 
may be hazarded by his conduct. For these 
reasons such covenants are sometimes 
declared invalid as being against public 
policy. However, this may depend upon the 
circumstances. The majority rule appears 
to be that in most situations, where such 
is the desire of the parties, and it is 
clearly understood and expressed, such a 
covenant will be upheld. But the presl..Dilp-
tion is against any such intention, and it 
is not achieved by inference or implication 
from general language such as was employed 
here. It will be regarded as a binding 
contractual obligation only when that inten-
tion is clearly and unequivocally expressed 
•••• If it had been the intent of the par-
ties that the defendant should indemnify 
the plaintiff even against the latter's 
negligent acts, it would have been easy 
enough to use that very language and to 
thus make that intent clear and unmistakable, 
which was not done here." (Emphasis ours.) 
The lease between the parties in the instant case 
has been in existence for a number of years without amend-
ment of any of its provisions. In spite of the plaintiff 
Railroad's knowledge and participation in the El Paso case, 
it nevertheless made no effort to alter or amend in any way 
its lease provisions with the defendant herein. This, in 
and of itself, appears to be an obvious indication that the 
parties had no intention of resorting to an indemnification 
agreement as is now alleged by the plaintiff or such a reword-
ing of the agreement would have been made. 
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This Honorable Court again reached the same conclu-
sion concerning indemnification agreements concerning ~ 
Rents Corp. vs. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 420 P.2d 848. 
The language of indemnity in the plaintiff's lease 
herein clearly does not attempt to exact an indemnity from the 
defendant where the plaintiff's negligent conduct is also in-
valved. 
Paragraph 5 of the lease specifically refers to the 
paragraph as a paragraph to prohibit the unlawful use of the 
premises and refers to the indemnification in the event the 
premises were unlawfully used. Paragraph 11 sets forth a 
reference to the defendant's liability but nowhere in that 
paragraph is the word indemnity or contribution ever mentioned. 
(R 99-100) 
Where the lessor or its employees are actively negli-
gent in some way in causing an injury, the courts simply do 
not require indemnification from the lessee. See 19 ALR 3rd, 
Page 1936, wherein the author states: 
"Where acts of the railroad and the indemni-
tor concurred to produce the injury for which 
indemnity is sought, both parties being negli-
gent to some extent, the courts have generally 
held that the railroad is not entitled to 
indemnity." 
See also Chicago & Illinois .Midland R. Co. vs. Evans Constr. 
Co. (1965), 208 NE2d 573, 19 ALR 3rd 921. The Illinois 
? 
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Court held that even under common law rules of indemnity, 
the railroad could not obtain indemnity from the owner of 
the spur track where the railroad and the owner of the spur 
track were at most equally guilty of the same negligence. 
In that case, the owner of the premises had contracted for 
construction work in the area. After the construction work 
had been completed, some of the old railroad ties were left 
on the premises but apparently not in an area immediately 
adjacent to the track. A tie was found near the track as 
an employee of the railroad was getting off the train to per-
form his duties. He fell over the tie and was injured. The 
railroad paid the employee when it was alleged that the rail-
road failed to provide him with a safe place to work and in 
so doing, was negligent. The railroad thereafter sought 
indemnity from the owner of the premises. The Illinois 
Supreme Court stated: 
"In the case before us, the plaintiff bases 
its right to indemnity upon the ground that 
the negligence of the defendant was active, 
while its own negligence was passive. It 
states that 'this case is predicated upon 
the impropriety of defendant in placing or 
failing to remove the tie which caused the 
employee's injury.' The plaintiff and its 
employees were business invitees. The 
plaintiff railroad was responsible for fail-
ing to afford the employees a safe place of 
employment. This it did not do, but this 
is passive negligence. Defendant, Pillsbury, 
the landowner, expecting plaintiff railroad's 
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-use of the premises, had the duty to make 
the premises safe for plaintiff and its 
employees. The breach of this duty is 
active negligence." 
The Court further stated: 
"The difficulty with this position is that 
there is no proof as to how the tie came 
to be where it was when the accident 
occurred or how long it had been there. 
The evidence supports the inference drawn 
by the trial court that the tie which 
caused the injury was one of the discarded 
ties belonging to the defendant, but it 
goes no further ••••• There is no evidence 
which suggests that the defendant or any 
of its employees placed the tie on the 
tracks, and there is no evidence which 
suggests that the defendant knew it was 
there. In the language of the restatement, 
the evidence does not show that the danger-
ous condition was created by the defendant. 
The breach of duty relied upon to shift the 
entire cost of the injury from the plain-
tiff to the defendant must therefore be 
the defendant's failure to discover and 
remove the tie •••• a failure to see that 
the premises were safe for the work that 
was to be done. That exact same duty rests 
upon the plaintiff." (Emphasis ours.) 
The Illinois Court then went on to state: 
"It is true that an inspection immediately 
prior to the accident was a preventative. 
But the duty to make such an inspection 
rested equally upon the plaintiff and the 
defendant." 
The Illinois Court then quoted from the case of 
Union Stockyards Company of Omaha vs. Chicago. Burlington, 
_Q_uincy Railroad Company, 196 U.S. 217, 25 Supreme Court, 226, 
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wherein the United States Supreme Court held that where 
both parties, the railroad and the defendant, failed to 
discover a hazard which both might have discovered by in-
spection, both are equally guilty of the same negligent 
conduct and no indemnity or contribution can be had. The 
Illinois Court then concluded its decision by stating: 
"In the present case, the plaintiff was 
not the usual business invitee, but was 
one which, in the conduct of its busi-
ness operations, was subject to a non-
delegable statutory duty to provide a 
safe place for its employees to work. 
That duty was no less stringent than 
the duty of the defendant as the owner 
of the premises. Since we hold that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to in-
deumity from the defendant, it is not 
necessary to consider whether the 
injured employee was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence." 
In the instant case, the contract between the 
Railroad and Intermountain Farmers contains but one refer-
ence to indemnity in the entire lease agreement. That 
reference is in Section 5 of the lease agreement under the 
heading "Use for unlawful purposes prohibited. Indemnity." 
The portion referring to indemnity then says 
" ••• the Lessee shall at all times protect 
the Lessor and the leased premises from 
all injury, damage or loss by reason of 
the occupation of the leased premises by 
the Lessee, or from any cause whatsoever 
growing out of said Lessee's use thereof." 
(R 99) 
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The accident in the instant case arose out of the 
use of the premises by the Lessor's use of the premises, not 
that of the Lessee. 
In the Howe Rents case, supra, the wording of the 
indemnification agreement was almost exactly the same as the 
wording of the agreement in the instant case insofar as it 
stated: 
follows: 
"Lessee assumes all liability for dam-
ages from accident ••• and agrees to 
indemnify and hold harmless the lessor, 
its officers, agents, and employees 
from any and all damages and/or liabil-
itity to any person whomsoever arising 
out of or resulting from the use, stor-
age or transportation of said equipment 
by the lessee or anyone else ••• " 
(Emphasis ours) 
This Honorable Court again stated the rule as 
"The general language, 'the lessee shall 
be liable for all damage to or loss of 
the equipment regardless of caus~' does 
not constitute a clear and unequivocal 
expression creating an obligation for 
the bailee to indemnify the bailer for 
the bailer 1 s negligent acts." 
The very limited reference to indemnity in the in-
stant lease clearly indicates that the parties did not 
contemplate such a broad indemnification as to require the 
Intermountain Farmers to pay for any and all negligence, 
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whether it be that of the Railroad's employees, its negli-
gence, or a combination of both. The Railroad undoubtedly 
will claim that because its liability arises under FELA, 
the lease agreement might require a different interpretation, 
It is respectfully pointed out that both parties at all 
times were aware of the obligations of the Railroad under 
the Federal Employer's Liability Act. Such being the case, 
this Court has previously stated: 
"It must be concluded that the parties when 
they entered into the contract had in mind 
the provisions of the FELA and the law 
applicable thereto." Oregon Short Line 
Company vs. Idaho Stockyard Company, 
12 Utah 2d 205, 364 f.2d 826. 
The fact that the Railroad is an FELA employer 
should not give it special privileges in the courts in the 
interpretation of its lease agreements. The lease agree-
ment contained in the instant case and its reference to 
indemnification is far less explicit and definitive than 
the provisions contained within the lease in the El Paso 
case, supra. In spite of this Court's admonition to plain-
tiff Railroad in the El Paso case that it should spell out 
unmistakably and clearly what acts would be required for 
indemnification, it nevertheless failed to do so in this 
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instant case. In spite of renewals of the lease, there has 
been no amendment to the terms in respect to indemnity or 
any interpretation thereof. One must then conclude that 
such was not an oversight by the Railroad. It obviously 
did not intend to exact such a stringent indemnification 
at the time the lease was renewed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was in error when concluding that 
the lease agreement provided absolute indemnification regard-
less of fault. The railroad employee, Richins, sued the 
Railroad, alleging that it was negligent in failing to pro-
vide him with a safe place to work. One can only conclude 
that the negligence was the failure of the trainee brakeman 
to either observe the obstruction near the track or his 
failure to heed its existence. In any event, the Railroad 
was obviously actively negligent in bringing about Richins' 
injury. The Railroad firmly and freely admits that its 
employees are specifically forbidden to move a train onto 
the tracks of a siding or any other area until the tracks 
are observed to be clear and free of obstruction. Obviously, 
neither was done by the employees of the Railroad in the 
instant case which caused the injuries. 
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It is respectfully submitted by Intermountain 
Farmers that its lease with the Railroad is not an absolute 
guaranty or a contract of insurance. The trial court was 
in error in concluding that it was. The most that could be 
said from the facts is that perhaps both the Railroad's 
employees and those of Intermountain Farmers were concurrently 
negligent in causing the injury. Such being the case, the 
lease agreement did not exact indemnification by virtue of 
its terms. The judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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